The Shin Bet security agency has published its own investigation into the October 7 Hamas attacks, acknowledging profound organizational failures while identifying a complex web of structural, intelligence, and political factors that contributed to Israel's security collapse. The report explicitly states that different actions by the agency "would have prevented the massacre" while providing unprecedented insight into the security establishment's blind spots.
Intelligence Assessment Framework Collapse
The investigation details how the Shin Bet's analytical framework fundamentally misread Hamas's intentions and capabilities. Hamas's comprehensive ground invasion plans (documented as "Jericho Walls") were obtained years earlier but never translated into operational scenarios or defensive preparations. Intelligence analysts maintained what the report calls an "incorrect understanding" of Israel's border defenses and the IDF's response capabilities.
Most critically, the agency incorrectly assessed that Hamas was focused on escalation in the West Bank rather than Gaza. Warning signals on the night of October 6-7, including suspicious SIM card activations in Gaza (45 detected) and sensor alerts along the border, weren't properly integrated or escalated. The report reveals that the Shin Bet viewed these activations as routine, noting similar numbers in October 2022 (38) and April 2023 (37) when no attacks materialized.
This parallel pattern emerged in the IDF's own investigation, which revealed that Hamas began planning the attack in April 2022 and finalized October 7 as the date in May 2023, yet Israel's security establishment maintained what military officials termed a "misperception" about Hamas's intentions and capabilities.
Structural and Organizational Vulnerabilities
The report identifies critical institutional weaknesses that prevented an effective response. An unclear division of responsibility between the IDF and Shin Bet regarding which organization should provide warning for military-scale attacks created accountability gaps that Hamas exploited. The Shin Bet's methodologies were designed for countering discrete terror attacks, not coordinated military-style invasions.
Information handling gaps and non-standard protocols during the critical night before the attack proved fatal to Israel's defensive posture. The investigation notes that at 3:03 a.m., the Shin Bet sent warnings regarding suspicious SIM activations to the IDF, police, and National Security Council, but these warnings weren't properly escalated. The agency had also experienced a gradual erosion of intelligence gathering capabilities within Gaza, particularly after Hamas's 2018 counterintelligence operations significantly damaged its human intelligence network.
Similar to the IDF's findings about its Gaza Division being "defeated and overrun," the Shin Bet report reveals a systemic breakdown in command structure and communication protocols. The investigation notes that even when intelligence was collected, it failed to reach decision-makers in a timely or actionable format.
Political and Strategic Environment Factors
In a politically significant portion of the report, the Shin Bet identified several government policies that contributed to Hamas's strengthened position. Israel's strategy of maintaining periods of quiet with Gaza enabled Hamas's military buildup. The flow of Qatari funding to Gaza, portions of which reached Hamas's military wing, provided critical resources for their military infrastructure development.
The investigation specifically noted that policies regarding the Temple Mount, treatment of Palestinian prisoners, and the perception of Israeli societal division during the judicial overhaul crisis served as catalysts for Hamas's decision to attack. This context aligns with the IDF's admission that for years, the security establishment prioritized northern threats from Hezbollah and Iran while treating Gaza as a secondary concern.
The report highlights that the Shin Bet had repeatedly warned political leadership about the progressive erosion of Israel's deterrence posture and recommended assassinating Hamas leaders and enhancing border security. Since 2021, the agency invested significant resources in preparing assassination operations against top Hamas leaders but faced resistance from the political echelon. The report indirectly criticizes the government's emphasis on defensive rather than offensive security measures, which allowed Hamas to build its capabilities unimpeded.
Leadership Response and Accountability Framework
Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar took unprecedented personal responsibility in his statement: "If the Shin Bet had acted differently, in the years leading up to the attack and during the night of the attack [...] the massacre would have been avoided. This is not the standard we expected of ourselves, or that the public expected of us."
The report immediately sparked political controversy, with Prime Minister Netanyahu's office releasing a statement claiming Bar "misread the intelligence picture" and failed to wake the Prime Minister on the night of the attack. According to Netanyahu's circle, the Shin Bet maintained that "Hamas sought to maintain calm" and recommended "granting civilian benefits to Hamas" just days before the attack.
Shin Bet officials reportedly qualified the claim that they had said Hamas was deterred as "an invention," stating they had warned about Hamas feeling secure while identifying internal divisions in Israeli society. This dispute highlights the politically charged nature of accountability discussions in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks
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This political dimension parallels the military accountability measures already taken, including the resignation of Gaza Division chief Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld and Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman.
Shin Bets Pathway to Comprehensive Reform
Bar concluded his statement by calling for a more comprehensive investigation examining the interface between security and political elements: "The path to reparation demands a broad process of clarity and truth." This appears to be an implicit call for a state commission of inquiry, which Prime Minister Netanyahu has thus far refused to establish.
The Shin Bet investigation, along with the IDF's parallel findings, points to the need for fundamental reconsideration of Israel's intelligence gathering methodologies, threat assessment frameworks, and strategic doctrine. Key recommended changes include strengthening border intelligence operations, improving information sharing between agencies, and developing more sophisticated analysis models that can challenge prevailing security assumptions.
The report revealed that the Shin Bet has already implemented significant organizational reforms, including splitting its intelligence collection focus in Gaza into many sub-geographic units, similar to how it operates in the West Bank. The agency has also altered its interactions with IDF Unit 8200 (The IDF Military Intelligence Directorate's main information gathering unit) to increase information sharing, though such improvements have been promised repeatedly in recent years without being implemented.
As with the IDF's acknowledgment that it can no longer view Gaza as a secondary threat while focusing primarily on northern challenges, the Shin Bet report suggests that Israel's entire security apparatus requires substantial reformation to address the complex, multi-dimensional threats facing the nation.
The investigation's release comes amid ongoing political debate about accountability for the October 7 security failures and growing public pressure for a formal independent investigation. The report's findings will likely shape Israeli security doctrine for years to come, particularly regarding intelligence analysis, inter-agency cooperation, and the balance between political considerations and security imperatives.
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