When Hamas launched its deadly assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) found itself overwhelmingly unprepared. Recent IDF investigations have now fully exposed the scale of the military breakdown that left communities along the Gaza border virtually defenseless.
On the morning of October 7, Hamas deployed over 5,000 fighters against just 767 Israeli soldiers stretched thin across the 59-kilometer Gaza border, creating a seven-to-one advantage that proved decisive in the early hours. Under the cover of nearly 4,700 rockets, Hamas terrorists simultaneously breached Israel's border fence at 114 different locations, including 37 gates they forced open.
As we documented in our comprehensive October 7 Timeline, the attack unfolded with precise planning using three carefully coordinated waves. First came elite Nukhba fighters targeting military installations followed by waves of ground troops focused on civilian communities. Hamas also deployed paragliders and maritime teams to create a complex assault that overwhelmed Israel's defenses.
Early Intelligence Failures Exposed by the IDF Investigation
What makes this failure particularly troubling is that much of the intelligence about Hamas's intentions was available but misinterpreted. The IDF investigation confirms Hamas decided on this attack plan in April 2022 and finalized October 7 as the date in May 2023. Yet Israel's security establishment maintained what the IDF calls a "misperception" about Hamas, believing the group was deterred and incapable of launching a major attack.
The investigation revealed that even when Israeli intelligence detected Hamas practicing raid simulations, these exercises were dismissed as unrealistic or merely aspirational. Despite having intelligence since 2018 about Hamas's plans for a large-scale attack, military intelligence assessed that the attack itself was "not feasible," misinterpreting the preparations as unlikely to materialize into an actual operation.
This intelligence blindspot stemmed from a fundamental error in Israel's strategic doctrine. For years, the security establishment prioritized northern threats from Hezbollah and Iran while treating Gaza as a secondary concern. This perspective became so entrenched that contradictory intelligence was routinely filtered through this distorted lens.
The Critical Night: Warning Signs Dismissed
The night before the Hamas attack on October 7 was marked by a cascade of missed opportunities and systemic failures. At 3:28 AM, the Air Force’s bureau chief sent a message stating, "Something is happening in Gaza, situation assessment at 8:30." Minutes later, the Shin Bet issued an update: "There are a number of signs indicating abnormalities. In a more severe view, they may indicate emergency preparations among Hamas. However, the indications show routine and restraint is being maintained." Despite these warnings, no formal alert was raised.
The investigation revealed severe gaps in intelligence assessment and information sharing that night. Intelligence sources focused on specific Hamas commanders rather than the broader picture in Gaza. Critical reports were handled inappropriately, with no formal processes followed. Information was shared informally via WhatsApp and phone calls, bypassing established protocols. No structured intelligence assessment was conducted at any level, and no comprehensive intelligence map was created. Key meetings to consolidate research, discuss enemy actions, or focus on actionable intelligence were never held.
Command decisions that night were also flawed. In the Gaza Division, the senior officer on duty lacked access to relevant intelligence sources. In the Southern Command, a young section head effectively acted as the Deputy Intelligence Officer due to staffing gaps. In the office of the head of Military Intelligence, the first update arrived only at 1:00 AM, with a follow-up at 3:00 AM. Senior officials assessed that Hamas was not preparing for imminent action and scheduled a discussion for the morning—by which time the attack was already underway.
The investigation concluded unequivocally that the current intelligence picture was sufficient enough to warrant an alert about a potential Hamas operation, even if only a limited raid or targeted attack was anticipated. However, the lack of a structured intelligence process and the mistaken assessment that there was no immediate threat led to inaction. This was compounded by the prevailing belief that Hamas was deterred and seeking a long-term stable arrangement. Commanders also imposed self-restrictions on deploying forces due to concerns about compromising intelligence sources.
At the Nahal Oz observation post, the situation was similar. The investigation found that the intelligence picture available that night should have been enough to raise an alert about a potential Hamas operation, even if not on the scale of the October 7 attack as it transpired. However, the absence of a formal process and the flawed assessment that no immediate threat existed prevented any action.
The investigations paint a picture of systemic, multi-dimensional failure. From the flawed assumption that Hamas was deterred, to breakdowns in intelligence and operational processes, to insufficient preparedness across all branches of the defense forces, the lapses were profound.
As part of the lessons learned, the investigation emphasized the need to "prevent the establishment of a terrorist army on our borders, develop defensive plans for surprise attacks, and create decisive offensive plans."
Command Collapse: Fighting Blind
The IDF’s admission that its Gaza Division was "defeated and overrun" for nearly ten hours during Hamas’s attack underscores a catastrophic failure in command and response. The assault on the Re’im Base—the nerve center of Israel’s Gaza border defenses—disabled communication and coordination, leaving senior commanders unaware of the disaster as it unfolded.
The attack began at 6:29 AM with Hamas’s initial barrage. Within eight minutes, the Gaza Division activated "Parash Peleshet," its most extreme infiltration protocol. However, this system was designed to handle small-scale breaches—dozens of operatives at up to eight locations—not the unprecedented 114-point invasion that unfolded. The protocol was immediately overwhelmed.
By 7:00 AM, only 15% of the attack incidents had been reported to IDF command, rising to 40% by 7:30 AM. Critical information lagged for hours. It wasn’t until 11:30 AM—five hours into the attack—that command centers were aware of 85% of the incidents. Even more shocking, the death of Southern Brigade commander Col. Asaf Hamami, who was killed shortly after 7:00 AM, wasn’t confirmed until 11:15 AM.
The loss of Col. Hamami and numerous other commanders shattered the IDF’s leadership chain. With communication disrupted and no clear hierarchy, troops were left disorganized and unable to mount an effective response. Reinforcements sent to the frontlines faced ambushes on approach routes, causing them to divert resources to secondary battles in places like Sderot. Meanwhile, Hamas carried out massacres in southern kibbutzim. Social media footage from Sderot drew disproportionate attention, overshadowing the atrocities in less visible communities.
Compounding the tragedy, Southern Command mistakenly believed they had evacuated 90% of the Nova music festival attendees. In reality, hundreds remained trapped as Hamas fighters closed in. Investigations later revealed that the festival was not a pre-planned target; Hamas stumbled upon it during their infiltration, turning it into one of the deadliest incidents of the day.
Multi-Dimensional Warfare: Air and Sea Vulnerabilities
The IDF investigation details critical failures beyond the ground invasion. The Air Force, despite following standby protocols, wasn't prepared for an attack of this magnitude. Two fighter jets couldn't take off immediately due to Hamas rocket fire targeting air bases. Without clear battlefield intelligence, pilots struggled to distinguish between terrorists and civilians in some cases. In a tragic illustration of this confusion, the investigation confirms that at least one hostage being abducted to Gaza, Efrat Katz, was killed when an IAF helicopter fired on a vehicle carrying both terrorists and captives.
There were similar preparation gaps with Israel’s naval force. Hamas deployed 38 terrorists in seven speedboats, each traveling at 30 knots about 500 meters offshore. While Navy patrol boats destroyed two boats at sea and three near the coast, two boats reached shore undetected. The 16 terrorists who landed killed 17 Israelis at Zikim beach. The Navy's preparation had only considered "one Hamas speedboat or two divers" as its extreme scenario, not the coordinated maritime assault that actually occurred.
The Human Cost and Accountability
The investigation makes it clear that the IDF was completely unprepared to protect civilians during fighting inside Israel. Even evacuation protocols failed, with wounded soldiers sometimes evacuated before civilians due to institutional habits;military medics treated soldiers while civilian services typically handled civilians.
These findings expose not just tactical failures but systemic collapse across intelligence, operational readiness, and command function. Israel's decades-long underestimation of Hamas created a dangerous complacency that allowed warning signs to be dismissed even in the final hours before the attack.
The lessons from this catastrophic security failure will reshape Israeli military thinking for decades to come. Key changes include strengthening border forces, improving intelligence integration into the overall structure of the army, and developing better threat assessment systems. Most importantly, the IDF acknowledges it can no longer view Gaza as a secondary threat while focusing primarily on northern challenges from Hezbollah and Iran.
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